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This study describes two models for the computation of
burst kill probabilities for air defense gun systems firing
non-fragmenting projectiles at non-maneuvering aircraft tar-
gets. Model I was suggested for U. S. Army use by Braddock,
Dunn and McDonald, Inc. and is currently used in the TACOS II
air defense battle simulation. Model II was developed by
the Systems Analysis Directorate, HQ, U. S. Army Weapons Com-
mand for use in gun system engineering development. The models
are contrasted in development to demonstrate the strengths,
weaknesses and relative merits of each. The Weapons Command
model appeared to be based on a less restrictive set of
assumptions than the BDM model, but sample results showed
near equivalence in model BKP values throughout a reasonable
range of engagement conditions.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
Air defense gun systems have maintained an important role
in air defense operations despite the advent of effective
surface-to-air missiles. Reference 1 reports that the U. S.
Air Force lost 550 aircraft to air defense guns in the Korean
Conflict, and more recently, U. S. forces lost more than 3000
fixed and rotary wing aircraft to enemy action in the Vietnam
War with just a small percentage of these losses due to
surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, these losses do not
reflect the considerable aircraft repair "burden imposed by
air defense guns nor the contributing effects (short of air-
craft destruction) that guns have in deterring piloted air-
craft from the accomplishment of their objectives.
The air defense objectives have remained relatively con-
stant over time, but the problems and technology of the gun/
target engagement have changed. Helicopters are now an inte-
gral part of the battlefield, tactical aircraft are faster and
more maneuverable, contour flying is possible under adverse
conditions and air-to-surface weapon systems can be incredibly
sophisticated. At the same time, digital computers, improved
sensor capabilities and surface-to-air missiles which force
higher targets to low altitude have favored the efficacy of
the air defense gun system.
Considering this continually improving capability of air-
craft to deliver their ordinance effectively, it is imperative
that every effort be made to assure that our forces are
8

equipped with the most effective air defense gun systems
possible.
The ultimate measure of success in the design and per-
formance of an air defense gun system is the tested ability
of the system to shoot down low flying hostile aircraft
within the combat environment. There exists, however, a
more general need to have a measure of system effectiveness
from a theoretical point of view that would allow for system
evaluation and for comparative analysis of competing systems
or sub-systems that could be applied in the development phase
through operational fielding of the system. One such measure
of effectiveness evolves from a system's ability to accurately
deliver its ordnance to the target's point in space. This
ability can be transformed into a kill probability based on
target and gun characteristics which can be expressed as a
single shot or burst kill probability.
It is this type of kill probability development as a
function of gun system and target parameters that motivates
this study. Computing the accuracy of a gun system and then
confounding it with aircraft vulnerability data to generate
a kill probability is a difficult theoretical and practical
problem. There exists in the literature a profusion of for-
mulas, tables and computational methods to assist in the solu-
tion of special cases of this type of engagement, but there
is a genuine need for unifying theory within which all
special cases can be rooted. Also of interest is the increas-
ing use of simulation to model combat and predict its results.

Simulations require validated methods to compute air defense
gun system kill probabilities based on prescribed battle sce-
narios .
The conclusion to be drawn from these comments is that
the computation of system kill probability is a valuable tool
which, as a current problem, merits immediate attention. It
is the intent of this study to present and analyze two exist-
ing models for the computation of gun burst kill probability
(BKP) in order that the general and relative merits of each
might be discerned. The two models were selected for comparison
because they are both in use at the present time by different
agencies within the Department of the Army. One is used as
a sub-model in the air defense battle simulation model,
TACOS II, and the other is used by U. S. Army Weapons Command
agencies for analysis of air defense gun systems in engineer-
ing development. It should be noted that this study represents
the author's interpretation of these models and is not to be
viewed as an official or final position report.
Model I is a model suggested for U. S. Army use by Braddock,
Dunn and McDonald, Inc. /^Ref . 2
J
'. It is a relatively basic
model patterned as a two-dimensional model for salvo (or
burst) firing of non-fragmenting projectiles.
Model II is a model suggested for U. S. Army use by the
Systems Analysis Directorate, HQ, U. S. Army Weapons Command,
Rock Island, Illinois /~Refs. 3 and hj. Its development is
similar to that of Model I in that target vulnerability is
represented in an identical manner in each and projectile
10

impact points are characterized as isolated random variables.
The actual development of Model II seeks to improve on Model I
by being based on a less restrictive set of assumptions. The
separate and aggregate effects of these assumptions are pre-
sented for comparison in this study.
The general development of Model I is traced in Chapter II
of this study with more detailed attention given to the signi-
ficant assumptions required in the process of model formulation.
This chapter identifies the theoretical basis for the general
approach of the model, and comments are added to amplify those
areas believed to be most critical to the model results.
Chapter III continues with the presentation of Model II
and begins the comparative analysis of the two models. Con-
trasts and similarities between models are presented, but
with emphasis placed on the development of key aspects of
Model II. Two separate cases are developed for this model
after the general form of single shot kill probability (SSKP)
has been shown. The two cases, A and B, contrast the effects
of the assumptions regarding the magnitude of SSKP. Case A
assumes that the product of the number of rounds in a burst
(n) and the SSKP is small, while Case B assumes only the
condition that SSKP is small.
Chapter IV concludes the comparative analysis of the two
models by stating possible advantages and disadvantages of
each. The general impression created by the qualitative
analysis suggests that Model IIA is essentially the same as
Model I, whereas Model IIB appears to be based on a less
11

restrictive set of assumptions than is required in either of
the other developments. Quantitative results of one represent-
ative test of the three model forms are presented in this
chapter to illustrate the conditions under which Model I
and Model IIA diverge. Somewhat surprisingly, the quantitative
analysis indicates that although Model I and Model IIB are
developed with two different approaches, the BKP results
remain nearly identical over the broad range of parameter
values exercised in the models.
12

II. BRADDOCK, DUNN AND MCDONAL INC. MODEL
FOR BURST KILL PROBABILITY-MODEL I
A. MODEL I INTRODUCTION
The general approach in Model I is the development of
single shot kill probability for one gun system firing at
one-maneuvering target which is then transformed into a burst
kill probability in order that it apply more directly with
the gun's normal mode of operation. This model was specifically
developed to support preliminary analysis of air defense gun
systems by examining the projectile/target relationships in
the form of equations which describe the intercept environ-
ment. Additionally, it is used as a sub-model in the TACOS II
air defense battle simulation to describe gun BKP as a function
of that intercept environment.
The operation of the model involves the following steps.
The gun system tracks its target, computes target character-
istics, predicts a time-dependent intercept point in space,
positions the gun and launches the projectile( s) . The target
is represented by a vulnerable area(A v ) in a plane in space
that is perpendicular to the slant range(R) between the gun
and the center of the symmetrically represented vulnerable
area. The center of the Ay is the center of
an (X,Y) coordi-
nate system that represents the reference plane on which
impact points for each projectile are measured and their dis-






















The remainder of this chapter describes the generation
of the model "by first developing SSKP and then transforming
it into BKP relying on the assumption of independence between
rounds in a burst. The final form of the BKP equation is
then reached through a discussion of the parameters which
constitute the model.
B. SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABILITY
The model assumes that projectile impact points in the
target plane are normally-distributed about each axis with
zero means and independence between the random variables X p
and Y which describe the projectile position in that plane.
The assumption of normality relies on the Central Limit
Theorem suggesting that error in the delivery of the projectile
is the sum of a large number of independent error sources
none of which contribute very much to the total error by
themselves. Experimental data is required to validate this
assumption.
The fact that the respective distributional means are
assumed to be zero has special implications when considering
a model for measuring single shot effectiveness of a weapon
firing a non-fragmenting projectile. A non-zero value of
expected impact point could result in a case where higher hit
probability results from larger projectile dispersion. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the point by depicting graphically the
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point and variance for a one-dimensional, normally distributed
random variable.
Cases 1 and 2 obviously result in greatest hit probability
with smallest dispersion, but Case 3 demonstrates the possible
existence of a situation in which hit probability is maximized
by making dispersion some finitely large value for a non-zero
mean. This theory is easily expanded to two-dimensions with
the same results. Reference 5 provides complete development
of these cases as well as adding other insights into the effects
on hit probabilities for a variety of mean, variance and
distributional relationships.
The normality assumption allows the representation of
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and R represent the range of target
values for x and y respectively.
This joint normal density representing projectile distri-
bution (delivery error) in the target plane has utility in
its present form, but it is transformed into polar coordinates
since target vulnerability is represented in this model develop-
ment by a circular area. It is also convenient to assume equal
variances with respect to each axis in order that the joint
normal might be represented as a circular normal distribution.
Reference 6, however, suggests that the greatest variability
in projectile error occurs along the azimuth(X)-axis where the
target velocity component is greatest. This implies that the
variances are in fact not equatable.
Continuing the transformation to polar coordinates:
PR,9 (r ' e) = f { 2^V 6XP { "T72 } ^^ W
The model assumes at this point that the target area seen
from the gun may be approximated by a smaller vulnerable area
(A ) which is represented geometrically as a circle with its
total area equal to the target vulnerable area. This assumption
relieves a great mathematical burden in the development of
BKP, but it creates another burden for the user who must
18

develop a reasonable technique for estimating A for a o.vw^ £ ro^o^
given target type, aspect angle and range. The notion of
vulnerable area is discussed further in Chapter III.B.
Continuing the development:
such that r =J A V./ TrA = it r'V
Equation (4-) now becomes:
R,9 (r,9) = / /
2 TT 1AV™ 1
2 it a
= exp{ - g- } rdrdG (5)
If A is developed such that one round impacting in that
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and finally,
A
SSKP = 1 - exp( - ^p
2 7T (J*
(7)
C. BURST KILL PROBABILITY
The extension of this model to account for BKP is facili-
tated by the assumption of total independence among rounds in
a-' burst. It is not an intuitively appealing assumption. Guns
with high rates of fire, as a minimum, suggest some correlation
between rounds with the same aim point and separated in the
firing sequence by only a very small increment of time.
19

Consider the simple case of a burst of two rounds. Let
A and B represent the events that each round hits the target.
The first round fired corresponds to A and the second round
corresponds to B. General probability theory suggests:
P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(AflB)
where P(A/) B) = P(A)-P(B/A)
Under the assumption of independence between rounds:
and / p(fl„e} y f(/*Ufi)4*v «»
P(AliB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A)-P(B) '
If the assumption is not valid, then the degree of corre-
lation between A and B must be ascertained in order that its
effects on the model be known. For example, if testing 0/ •>
demonstrated that there was positive correlation between
A and B, then the conditional probability of B given A would
always be greater than the unconditional probability of B.
The result would be a consistently higher estimate for BKP.
The degree of this correlation would dictate the magnitude
of the error in the general model caused by such an assumption.
It remains possible, however, that the net effect of an
erroneous assumption at this point might be negligible, so
once again test data is required to support or refute it.
Possible error notwithstanding, the development continues
with n equal to the number of rounds per burst, each normally
distributed and each having independent SSKP as developed.
7 20

P(all n miss) = (1 - SSKP) n (8)
BKP = 1 - P(all n miss) = 1 - (l-SSKP) n





BKP = 1 - exp ( 2L_ ) (9)
2tt a ^
This model asserts that BKP increases with an increase
in target A^ and with an increase in the number of rounds in
a burst. The variance term suggests BKP decreases if the gun
system is less accurate in its delivery capability. In its
current form, BKP is a function of three parameters none of
which causes counterintuitive impact on the value of BKP. One
difficulty, however, arises when the user tries to incorporate
this model into his scenario. Where does one acquire the
appropriate values for n, A and a ?
Burst size can be fixed at a reasonable level based on
known firing rates or it may be simply varied in the equation
for BKP and in field tests to determine the degree of its
effect on BKP. Vulnerable area and variance are not so easily
deduced. A is not necessarily a function simply of target
total area, but rather it is more probably a function of an
aggregation of many factors relating directly to the target,
and perhaps others attributed to the gun and its projectile
characteristics. This issue is discussed further in the
development of Model II in Chapter III.B.
21

The variance in a gun system's delivery capability is
another factor that has considerable impact on model results,
but is difficult to determine quantitatively. Expressions for
variance have been advanced with varying degrees of resolution,
and they all share the commonality of being just estimates.
This model considers only the aggregated dispersion due to
aiming and ballistic errors rather than an in depth analysis
of the many system functions that contribute to the net effect.
The model form allows for easy adjustment as techniques improve
for developing system variation components. Variance as
represented in Eq. (9) is a function of slant range (R) bet-
ween gun and target as well as being related to aiming and
ballistic errors. Model form requires that variance be expressed
in units such as square meters. If the aiming and ballistic
contributions to variance are developed in angular units,
and if it is assumed that angular dispersion is constant over





2 (meters 2 ) = R 2 (meters 2 ) • a
2 (radians 2 )
such that




2 7T R p
Consider the sources of variance in the projectile distri-
bution. This model suggests, as does Helgert in Ref. 7, that
variance may be thought of as an aggregation of independent





2 2Let aB and a. represent these variance terms in square
meters. The aiming error variance represents all those fac-
tors which contribute to the condition that the gun is not
actually pointing exactly at the desired aim point at the time
of firing. It constitutes effects due to components that com-
pute target parameters, system servo mechanisms, alignment
problems, gunner effects and others. These factors, as
was discussed in a previous section of this study, are assumed
to result in a normally distributed aiming error with zero
mean and the variance term as just described. In general,
? p p ? 2 2
of (meters ) = R (meters ) • o AR (radians )
Ballistic dispersion is a function of many projectile
characteristics such as muzzle velocity and weight plus effects
due to ambient conditions. Experience has supported the
assumption that ballistic error be represented as a random
variable with a normal distribution of zero mean and variance
as given. In general,
a | (meters 2 ) = R 2 (meters 2 ) • a BR (radians )
Considering that the sum of two independent normal random
variables is again a normally distributed random variable with
parameters also additive, it is possible to conclude that:
a
2 (radians 2 ) =o |R + a |R (radians )
23

When applied to Eq, (10), the result is the final form
for Model I.
BKP = 1 - exp { -
2tt R ( a AR +a BR )
" py «**' (11)
2^

III. U. S. ARMY WEAPONS COMMAND MODEL FOR BURST
KILL PROBABILITY-MODEL II
A. MODEL II INTRODUCTION
Model II' s development parallels that of Model I in that
it first develops an expression for single shot kill probability
and then transforms that into an appropriate form for burst
kill probability. It constitutes an expansion of the Analytic
Gun Model developed by the University of Michigan, System
Research Laboratory for the U. S. Army Weapons Commnd. See
Ref. 8 for the original development.
The model asserts that target vulnerability can be repre-
sented in a plane perpendicular to the slant range from the
gun to the target at the point of predicted intercept. There
is existing methodology that would allow the representation
of three-dimensional targets, but its adaptation at this point
in the model would be unnecessarily cumbersome to its develop-
ment. Reference 8 describes the methodology as well as amplifies
the notion of vulnerable area.
The projectile distribution in this target plane has a
probability density function defined as fx>Y (x ' y) where the
x and y values relate to coordinate axes centered at the target
center of vulnerability. Some analyses refer to this origin
as intended aim point. This density describes the
position of




Part B of this chapter initiates the theoretical "basis
for this model by describing the development of single shot
kill probability. The distributional form of the random
variables that describe rounds impacting the target plane
is proposed and the notion of vulnerable area is addressed
in detail. Once SSKP is presented, the concept of a burst
center random variable is introduced. This concept is one
method for improving upon the undesirable assumption of
independence between rounds in a burst used in Model I to
transform SSKP to BKP. It is at this stage of the develop-
ment of BKP in Part C of this chapter that Model II is
divided into two cases. The two cases, A and B, are necessary
in order that a key assumption regarding the magnitude of
SSKP might be approached from two different aspects. The
development of each case is related with some final comments
concerning contrasts in the theoretical bases for Model I
and the two cases of Model -IXa___
B. SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABILITY
The general development of SSKP relies on several key
assumptions. The first of which is that target vulnerable
area remains constant over the time of the engagement, i.e.
A (t) = A . Target/gun geometry does not allow this to be
technically true, but the validity of BKP as a good measure
of system effectiveness is not necessarily negated by its
acceptance. Assume further that the total aircraft silhouetted




vulnerable area, and that one hit in that area produces a
target kill. If the distribution of the projectile in the
target plane has a large dispersion with respect to that
area, then the small target approximation may be invoked
to conclude that:
j^u
-to- ^SSKP .fXfY (x,y) • Av
where x and y are evaluated at target center (0,0).
The small target approximation is noted here even though
the necessary distributional assumptions for the projectiles
have not been advanced. It is known that this model will
assume a bivariate normal distribution for the projectiles
in the target plane with zero means and no correlation. The
result is a distribution of the form hypothesized in Model I
and represented by Eq. (3)« If the variances are large
relative to the x and y values for target dimensions, then
the quotients in the power of the exponential are approximated





where x«y = target area for a rectangular target which
equates to A . The quotient in this approximation corresponds
to the density function in the SSKP formula when it can be
assumed normal with zero means, no correlation and evaluated
at the aim point, (0,0).
27

Considering this approximation as an analog to an argument
of conditional probability may help to clarify its basis
while at the same time providing some insight to the notion
of vulnerable area. In general,
P(kill) = P(hit) • P(kill/hit)
which when applied to this example suggests:
A




where the quotient here is essentially a lethality function
in which the assumption that A is uniformly distributed over
A. is implicit. The quantification of A is a potential
problem for the user of the model. Ballistic Research Lab-
oratories are said to provide data of this nature, but in
order to effectively exercise the model, one must be aware
of the subtleties involved in defining A
v>
The analogy to







where it can be seen that the density function is the probabil-
ity of hitting a vulnerable area of unit size. This factor
is based exclusively on gun system characteristics and leads











so that in the original form for SSKP, Av equates to the






input for the effects due to target parameters as well as
some consideration for projectile characteristics.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that SSKP in
'*,•/)/!«
its present form may he computed by describing during the
--fyf*,))^^-
^-Av / t
course of an engagement the presented target area, the
ft,
lethality relationship for the given gun and target and
the distribution of projectiles over the target A .
The user is still somewhat burdened at this point by
the need to determine a reasonable lethality relationship.
Model I assumes the simplest case of uniformly distributed
vulnerability over total target area. If the target is
depicted geometrically as a shoebox in space, then the gun
system views a silhouetted area made up of three side-related
components of the box. The target vulnerable area is then
just a scaled down representation of that total area as
illustrated in Figure 3. The mathematics of the develop-
ment is facilitated by the conversion of A^ to a circular
area of equivalent magnitude. Parry, in Ref. 9. suggests
a higher resolution methodology for determining Ay as a
function of gun/target aspect angle and total presented
area. It assumes pockets with varying degrees of vulner-
ability within the target profile as illustrated in Figure ^.
The effect of a round impacting in the cockpit or engine
compartment might produce more catastrophic consequences
than a round impacting in an avionics section or some other
less critical area. The notion of compartments of vulner-
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factor has its merits in theory and in practice may "be
applied to this model just as simply as less detailed tech-
niques .
Having considered the notion of vulnerable area, it
remains for this chapter to develop an acceptable form for
the density describing the projectile distribution in the
target plane before the final form for SSKP can be presented.
Consider the locations in three-space (R~) of both the
target and the projectile at the predicted time of intercept.
A three-dimensional coordinate system is proposed in R~ with
its origin at the target center of vulnerability with axes
X, Y, and 2.
X = horizontal (azimuth) coordinate in the plane of the
target
7
Y = vertical (elevation) coordinate in the plane of the
target
Z = range coordinate perpendicular to the plane of the
target along the slant range from the target to the
gun.
It is assumed at the time of predicted intercept (t) that:
(i) There exists an error vector (A A, AE,AR)(t)
corresponding to the distance between the target
center of vulnerability and the projectile.
(ii) Each component of the error vector is the sum
of random errors due to independent random




Limit Theorem is invoked such that the error
vector may be assumed to have a multivariate
normal distribution of dimension three and zero
covariances.
This is a major departure from conditions described in Model
I, in that due to range error, ^ R, the projectile will pro-
bably not be coincident with the target plane at (t). Conse-
quently, the error distribution in R^ at (t) must be projected
into the actual target plane R ? . The projectile distribution
in R ? corresponds to the multivariate normal distribution in
R~ at a time when range-to- target and range-to-projectile are
equivalent for the gun. Define a new set of coordinate axes
in R- as (X*,y') which correspond to the X and Y axes in R~,
respectively.
At the time of predicted intercept, the target is described
• • •
by the velocity components (A-R, E.R, R)(t), and the projectile
velocity components are (0, 0, V )(t), where:
ir
A = target velocity in the X-direction in radians/second
E = target velocity in the Y-direction in radians/second
R = target velocity in the Z-direction in meters/second
R = slant range from gun to target in meters
V = projectile velocity in meters/second
The non-maneuvering target is assumed to have a constant
velocity vector over the time of flight, tf , of the projectiles.
The degree of effect of this assumption can be substantial
if the target is changing velocity during the engagement,
33

but there is no effect on the model as long as it is under-
stood that this model is restricted to the non-maneuvering,
constant velocity target case. Theory has been advanced for
the maneuvering target case in Ref . ^, but it will not be
addressed in this study.
The time between conditions of equal range and time of
predicted intercept is represented by the random variable, a t.
It is easily assumed that A t is small such that the projectile
velocity, V , may be considered constant over a t, and the
relative velocity of the projectile with respect to the




A^ " - "y
P
Returning to the error vector ( AA , AE,A R)(t), the multi-
variate normal assumption implies that:
A A % N(Mx , a
*)
A E ^ N(M , a b
«y «y
A R % N(M z , a \)
These random variables are projected into R„ at t + A t.
This projection results in the creation of two new random
variables Aa' and. A E* which relate azimuth and elevation
errors to the X* and y' axes, respectively. Considering
Eq.(13), the error terms become:
3^

AA (t + At) = (AA -At • A • R)(t)
= ( A A +
-AS
. a • R)(t) (1*0
P
A E'(t + At) = ( A E - A t • E • R)(t)
= ( AE + -AS- • A • R)(t) (15)
P
A A and A E' are the sums of the independent, normal random
variables a A, aE, and a r « Therefore, they have a bivariate





. a y ')
The result of combining these two distributions is that at
t+At,
f • . (x,y) = - . a ' exp {
x ,Y 2tt a .. a , . n/ 1-
p
-2(l-p^)
(x-M ') 2 (x-Mv .)(y-M, .
)
-2
- 2 p - ^
{
a 2, a x
. ffy '
(y-M ,) 2
+ 5* > > (16)
a •
y
This function must be evaluated at some point in the
target plane in order that it represent the engagement at
intercept. It is assumed that the target is 'perfectly'
35

located and that the center of vulnerability is in fact the
aim point so that the projectile distribution is projected
into the target plane with the effect measured over target
center. Therefore, the function is evaluated at (x,y) = (0,0).
When combined with the vulnerable area term, this yields the
final form for SSKP:
SSKP = A
v
• f^ Y .(0,0)
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C. BURST KILL PROBABILITY
Model I assumed at this point in its development that
rounds in a burst are independent of each other in effects
on the target. As was discussed, this is counterintuitive,
but it has merit in that it conveniently eliminated some
formidable obstacles in the model development. Model II
suggests that the negative aspects of this independence
assumption may be lessened by considering an alternative
solution to the transformation from SSKP to BKP.
The alternative proposes that groupings of rounds that
are either distinctly separated bursts or arbitrarily divided
bursts be considered for collective effect. The centers of
the bursts are defined as (R^,R 2 ) and are assumed to be
36

independent, normally distributed random variables. The
advantage to be gained from the introduction of this random
variable is that the Central Limit Theorem confirms that the
distribution of the burst centers is in fact normal regardless
of the underlying distribution of the individual projectiles.
By assuming the mean value of the projectile distribution
to be the burst center, BKP may be developed by conditioning
on the known burst center distribution.
The following terms are defined to assist in the develop-
ment of the BKP equation:
SSMP = Single Shot Miss Probability = 1 - SSKP
BMP = Burst Miss Probability = 1 - BKP
n = number of rounds per burst
(R1 ,R ? ) = burst center coordinates in the (X' , Y') plane
(X.. ,X ) = position of the individual projectiles impacting
the (X 1 ,Y') planer-
Assume that:
(i) X.. and X p are independently distributed in the
(X
,
,Y*) plane. This facilitates bypassing the
problems associated with trying to quantify the
correlation between the two random variables. The
mathematics which follow are also more tractable.
Once again, it is difficult to assess the ultimate
-^This is identical with the (X,Y) notation used earlier.
It is changed here to facilitate the matrix notation that




effect on the model results, but it is clear that
increasing the number of assumptions of this type is
narrowing the margin of difference between the develop-
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(ii) Burst centers (R, ,R





, a 3 ) | ^
with correlation coefficient, p .
2 2..
.
a-, and a 2 are dispersion factors in the distribution
of individual rounds due to ballistic errors and gun dynamics
2 2
errors. The a o and a h variance terms are a measure of
the dispersion of the burst centers in the target plane.
The subscripts 1 and 2 replace x' and y for convenience.
Consider the development of BKP conditioned on the distribu-
tion of the burst centers.
BMP = E(BMP/(R1 ,R 2 )) (18)
= E( (SSMP) n/(R1 »R2 ) }
= B( (l-SSKP) n/(R1 »R 2 ) ) (19)
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If n-SSKP is small, then (l-SSKP) n may be approximated
by the first two terms of its binomial expansion. This assump-
tion essentially says that the gun system being considered
is functionally incapable of performing its intended mission.
For gun systems with high rates of fire, experience suggests
that SSKP may be assumed small, but not n«SSKP. Development
of the model under both of these conditional assumptions are
traced here to illustrate the impact of each.
First, if n«SSKP is small, Eq. (19) may be expressed as:













BKP = E{ exp { -
2tt a -1 Op 2 a- 2 a V (Ri' R 2 ) } (20)1 6 u 2
The solution of this expectation is facilitated by the use













Consider the following solution to a general conditional
expectation as a model for the form of BKP as it is trans-
formed from Eq. (20) to Eq. (21). From Ref. 11,
39





00" 00 27T a., ov12
exp ( 1- r' R )
2tt| V
• exp ( 1- (R - M) V 1(R-M)) dR1 dR2
(21)
Banash, in Ref . 3» develops the solution to this double
integral by manipulating its terms until it can he observed
that it is the integral form of the moment generating function
















and ] =0, if it is assumed that burst center means are zero.
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and the final form for Model IIA
,
n«A
tM/» ( *.$$tfl /A *»**
BKP = v
2u( ( a 3 + a ^ ) • ( a ij, + a 3) ) (24)
Now consider the second case where only SSKP is considered
small. The development proceeds essentially the same as that
of the first case, by conditioning on the location of burst
centers
.
BMP = E( (l-SSKP) n/(Rr R 2 ) )
Consider the expansion of (1-SSKP) .
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exp(--|.j yA(I-j(I+jA)" xA) v_ ) (25)
BKP is difficult to quantify in this form, however, it may
he greatly simplified if the burst means once again are
assumed zero and if the correlation "between R, and Rp is
small enough to assume to be zero.
The result of combining these assumptions with the general
BKP formula is:






a l a 2
{(°1+ j a 2)(a ^ + jap/
Adding this result to Eq. (26) produces the final form of
Model IIB:










2, . _ 2U2{(af+jaf (ffffjag)}
(27)
When just one round is fired, this result for BKP is
exactly the same as the result in Eq. (2*0 when it was
assumed that n«SSKP was small rather than just SSKP. This
hz

adds some degree of confidence to the mathematical manipula-
tions involved in reaching the two final forms of the BKP
equations
.
It is interesting to note at this point that although
the developments of Models I and II have appeared to follow
completely different tacks, it seems that Model I and Model IIA
have produced the same result. It is perhaps more clear if
one considers the following. In general, for small 2,
1 - e~ Z » l-(l-Z) = 2
Therefore, from Model I, considering the original assumption
that dispersion was much larger than vulnerable area, Eq. (11)
may be restated as:
n*A
BKP = S 2 2 (28)2, (R 2 ( 2r+ a 2R))
This result may be viewed as nearly identical with Model IIA
as expressed in Eq. (2*0. The only possible difference being
the manner of generating and expressing the variance components
of projectile delivery. Thus, it might be deduced that Model I
is implicitly assuming in its development that n x SSKP is
small, or conversely, Model IIA may have implicit within its
development the assumption of independence between rounds of
a burst. The negative significance of these two basic assump-
tions cast serious doubt on the veracity of each of these
models as they exist in Eq. (11) and Eq. (2^).
k3

Nonetheless, the extension of Model II resulting in
Eq. (27) provides alternatives to these two undesirable
assumptions. Stating optimism for this modification to the
model is one thing, validating its results remains another.
Some discussion has been presented regarding the notion of
vulnerable area since it is a key input parameter to the
models , but very little information has surfaced in this
model about the origins of the variance terms. The Appendix
is included to demonstrate the degree of resolution possible
in computing variance and the manner of application to the
general BKP form.
Chapters II and III of this study have traced the major
steps in the development of the three model forms. Although
some comparative comments have been made, it remains for
Chapter IV to present the general overview of the models
and to identify the salient features that might order the
relative worth of each. Hypothesized examples are proposed
to allow some objective interpretation of the models that
has been lacking due to the subjective nature of the material
presented to this point.
1*4

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The development of both models for determining gun system
BKP has demonstrated many of the usual obstacles inherent
with attempts to explain mathematically complex phenomena
such as military combat operations. The use of assumptions
to overcome points of resistance or excessive complexity
serves the function of lubrication in the development, but
it is always a lubricant with a price. The extent of that
cost is difficult effect to measure, especially when many
assumptions are layered within the development. These two
BKP models are fraught with assumptions that facilitate the
mathematics of each, but which are at best difficult to
evaluate with respect to the net effects on the accuracy of
model results. .It is for this reason that this study makes
frequent reference to the need for data from actual system
tests to assist in validating the models and to measure the
effects of specific assumptions. Data from tests of existing
systems may be applied generally to these models without the
models losing their general applicability which earlier was
proposed as one of their basic raisons d'etre. This study
has been conducted without the benefit of test data so that
assumptions have been necessarily discussed from a theoretical




Both BKP models are initiated with the realization that
BKP is one measure of effectiveness that has a broad base of
application in the field of air defense gun system evaluation
and simulation. They present and describe identical gun/
target environments and engagement procedures whereby one
gun system encounters one non-maneuvering target. The concepts
involved in the process of developing both models are essent-
ially the same as for any general target destruction model.
The process consists of factors which affect the distribution
of projectile impact points and the lethality of the projectile
as a function of impact points and target characteristics.
The factors which affect the impact point distribution may
be considered as potential error producers which may be synth-
esized from sub- components, and the system lethality may be
expressed as a function of target and projectile parameters.
These concepts allow the general approach of analysis to
be one of modeling a random process. The random variables in
the process are target location error, aim point error, and
gun system projectile delivery error. In both models, target
location errors and aim point errors have been combined for
convenience and each error term is assumed to have its distri-
bution described by some probability density function. Specifi-
cally, the circular normal and the bivariate normal distri-
butions have been assumed appropriate for Model's I and II ,
respectively. When firing bursts, the aim point error is
realized only once for each burst whereas the delivery error
is realized for every round. This delivery error suggests
46

some correlation between rounds in a burst and some correlation
between effects of each round when transforming SSKP to BKP.
Conclusions about a preferred model for BKP would be
somewhat dangerous and suspect at this point without test
data to support them, but it is possible to represent trends
in the general application of the three BKP forms. Sample
computations have been generated by permuting hypothesized
values for burst size with varied levels of dispersion for
the projectile and burst center distributions. Bursts range
in size from 1 to 100 rounds while vulnerable area is held
constant at 1.0 square meter. Dispersion, as represented by
the standard deviations of the distributions discussed, are
considered in three categories to reflect near, intermediate
and long range effects. The intermediate range values for
standard deviation are hypothesized and are then halved and
doubled to reflect near and long range conditions, respective-
ly. The selection of actual magnitudes for these values is
completely arbitrary and in no way reflects real data. The
range of values selected is intended only to provide a large
enough spread to be able to identify representative trends in
the model quantitative results. Tables I, II and III are
presented to demonstrate the effects on BKP of these permuta-
tions, and to show trends in the models individually and
comparatively.
Results for each of the three BKP forms are remarkably
similar for burst sizes less than 20 in the intermediate
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sizes increase past 20 reflect the point at which the assump-
tion that n x SSKP is small tends to lose its veracity. The
near and long range cases support the conclusion that 1 small'
refers to values of approximately . 2 or less for n x SSKP.
The development of Model IIB demonstrated what appeared
to be some clear improvements theoretically over some of the
more undesirable assumptions of Model I, but the sample
results in each of the three tables show near equivalence in
BKP values throughout. It was suggested earlier that if a
positive correlation existed between rounds in a burst, then
the independence assumption in Model I would result in con-
sistently high estimates for BKP. The result of slightly lower
BKP values for Model IIB may reflect the degree of affect
caused by that different approach.
The point has been emphasized that the models require
validation before their individual merits can be ascertained,
however, they do have considerable intuitive and practical
appeal as they currently exist. The relationship between
model parameters and solution behavior are easily recognized
in each model and they are easily applied in simulation.
They represent a convenient practical and theoretical base
from which to study or perform parametric analysis on exist-




Variance of the Critical Random Variables
Each component of the error vector at time, t, was assumed
to be the aggregation of errors attributable to independent
sources, each of which was said to be normally distributed.
Consider the development of these random variables.
1. Errors Contributing to aA .
a. Azimuth Sensing - Let Al(t) be the random variable
denoting the angular error resulting from sensor
azimuth errors. It results in error on the X-axis
equal to (Al«R)(t). Where,
E {(Al-R)(t)} = R.MA1 (t)
y {(Al.R)(t)} = R
2
. a^(t)
b. Azimuth Rate Sensing - Let A(t) be the random
variable denoting the angular error resulting
from sensor azimuth rate errors. It results in
t
error on the X-axis equal to (A«tf -R)(t) where
tf is the time of flight of the
projectile to
predicted intercept. Mean and variance terms
are given by:
E {(A-t f -R)(t)} =







c. Gun Pointing Error - Let A2(t) be the random
variable denoting azimuth error resulting from
gun pointing errors. It results in error on the
X-axis equal to (A2-R)(t). Mean and variance
are given by:
E { (A2-R)(t) } = R- MA2 (t)
V ( (A2-R)(t) }= R 2 . af2(t)
2. Errors Contributing to AE.
Errors with respect to the Y-axis which constitute
AE(t) are developed identically as for ^A(t).
3. Errors Contributing to a R«
a. Range Sensing - Let Rl be the random variable
denoting the range error resulting from range
sensor errors. It results in error on the Z-axix
equal to (Rl)(t). Mean and variance are given
by:
E {(Rl)(t)} = MR1 (t)
V {(Rl)(t)} = aR1 (t)
b. Range Rate Sensing - Let R be the random vari-
able denoting range error resulting from range
rate sensing errors. It results in an error on






f)(t) } = tf - M£(t)
V {(R-tf)(t) } = t|- a|(t)
c. Muzzle Velocity Error - Let A V be the random vari-
able denoting muzzle velocity variations result-
ing in range errors ( AR) . Reference 1, by
employing the 3/2 power law, shows that the range
error contributions may be represented as:
E {AR } due to AV =0
d 2 2
V {AR } due to aV = (-y^-)' a v
P
Considering these error contributions random variables, it

























= (R 2 . o E1 +R
2
• °| 2 + t 2 -R 2 • crg)(t)
Once again, with target vulnerability represented in a
plane, these results are applicable only when they can be
5^

projected into that plane. Combined with Eq. (1^) and Eq.
(15)
.
the distribution parameters become:
A-RV ={R ' MAl + R ' MA2 + -f^ ( MR1+ MR -t ) }(t)
P
J. A* J.
V = t R< %1 + »• ME2 + -fS- ( MR1 + Mr -tf ) }(t)
2
, 2 2 2
2





and the correlation coefficient is given by:
1 Cov ( A A', AE').P =
a 1 a '
x y
where
COV ( A A! AE') = E { ( A A* - E( a a'))( a e' -E(AE'))}
This is easily expanded to show that:
2 2









These are the input variables which lead to the solution of
Eq. (I?) and the value of SSKP. They demonstrate a technique
for synthesizing SSKP as a function of its many basic inputs.
The task of accurately determining and validating each of
these components remains to be accomplished.
It is encouraging to see such a logical and basic approach
to the calculation of delivery error variance, but that appeal
should not be allowed to cloud the practical aspects of its
inclusion or adaptation to the model. The actual variance
values used in the quantification of BKP are engineering
estimates that may or may not be correct. The question con-
cerning whether it is better to use one estimated variance
value for the overall system or a synthesized value accumulated
from a number of lesser estimates is no less difficult to
answer in this case then for any other modeling problem.
The development traced in this appendix appears to have a
great deal of merit, but it will be of no real consequence
to the computation of BKP unless it is possible to show
confidence in the methodology for fixing the values of the
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